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How Brexit Opens a Window of  
Opportunity for Treaty Reform in the EU
The decision of the UK to leave the EU has important constitutional implications 
for the EU. Whether they like it or not, after the UK formally withdraws, the 
remaining EU member states will need to change the EU treaties and other quasi-
constitutional EU laws to account for a new Union at 27. Brexit offers therefore 
a window of opportunity for a broader constitutional reform of the EU.





The decision of the British people in the June 2016 
referendum to leave the European Union (EU) has 
shocked analysts and policy-makers around the globe. 
The result of the Brexit referendum has led to major 
economic and legal uncertainty – revealing the com-
plexities of withdrawing from the EU. In the im me - 
diate aftermath of the referendum the attention has 
been focused on the United Kingdom (UK), with 
urgent questions about the modalities and the timing 
of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, and discussions 
about the future potential relations between the UK 
and the EU. Hence, debates have taken place (and 
litigation has been started) about who should notify 
the EU of the UK’s decision to leave – whether this 
can be done by the UK government acting on its own, 
or whether it requires the assent of Parliament.2 
Moreover, discussions have emerged about when the 
1  Federico Fabbrini is Full Professor of EU Law at the School of Law & Government of Dublin City University. He holds a PhD in Law from the European 
University Institute. 
2 See e.g. Nick Barber et al., “Pulling the Article 50 ‘Trigger’: Parliament’s Indispensable Role”, UK Constitutional Law Association Blog, 27 June 2016. 
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UK is required to officially notify the European 
Council of its decision to withdraw from the EU.3 And 
several analyses have been produced on what the 
future relationship between the UK and the EU is 
going to be – whether the UK should join the 
European Economic Area (EEA), opt for a Swiss-style 
solution, or rather go it alone in trading with the EU 
on the basis of the rules of the World Trade 
Organization.4 Clarity on each of these issues can only 
be expected to emerge over the coming weeks and 
months, as the UK works out with the EU the modali-
ties of its secession.5
Nevertheless, Brexit does not only impact the UK. In 
fact, the British decision to leave has important 
implications for the EU too. The effects of Brexit on 
the EU are economic and political – but also legal and 
institutional. This point has so far been largely ne-
glected in the discussions following the referendum’s 
results. This may not be entirely surprising. After all, 
the very idea that a member state would leave the EU 
was generally considered to be inconceivable. In fact, 
according to Giuliano Amato, the main drafter of 
Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) –  
which contains the provision of the EU treaties regu-
lating the withdrawal of a member state from the EU – 
this clause was never actually meant to be used.6 Yet, 
as European policy-makers grapple with the momen-
tous decision by a member state to pull out of the EU, 
a striking reality seems to emerge: the withdrawal of 
a country compels the EU and its (remaining) member 
states to engage in some significant legal and consti-
tutional reforms in order to adapt the EU’s legal 
framework to the new normal of a Union at 27. In 
short, Brexit produces constitutional consequences, 
and creates the need for legal and institutional re-
forms, not only in the UK, but also in the EU.
This paper examines from an EU law perspective some 
of the most immediate constitutional reforms which 
the EU and the member states will have to face as a 
result of Brexit.7 As the paper claims, when the UK 
will complete its withdrawal from the EU pursuant to 
the procedure set forth in Article 50 TEU, the EU and 
its (remaining) member states will have to amend the 
EU treaties – specifically changing Article 52 TEU on 
the territorial scope of EU law. Moreover, the EU 
institutions and the member states will have to adopt 
other key legal acts – such as a new decision on the 
allocation of the seats in the European Parliament, 
and new rules on the funding of the EU – which have 
essentially a constitutional status and in fact require 
unanimity in the Council, European Parliament’s 
consent, and ratification by the member states in 
accordance with their respective constitutional re-
quirements. As the paper underlines, therefore, 
Brexit will call for significant constitutional reforms 
within the EU, no matter whether the member states 
and the EU institutions like it or not. As the paper 
suggests, however, the revisions compelled by the 
UK’s withdrawal offer a window of opportunity to fix 
several other problems of the current EU institutional 
set-up. In particular, the need to amend the EU 
treaties and other quasi-constitutional EU norms pro- 
vides an opportunity to incorporate into EU law some 
of the intergovernmental agreements concluded  
in the aftermath of the Euro-crisis – as argued by the 
Five Presidents’ Report of June 20158 – as well as to 
push forward other reforms consensually regarded as 
indispensable to put Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) on a more solid grounds.9
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 exam-
ines the amendment to the EU treaties necessitated 
by Brexit. Section 3 outlines the revisions to other 
sources of EU law of a quasi-constitutional nature 
which will be inevitably triggered by the withdrawal 
of the UK. As it will be pointed out, the changes to 
acts such as the decision on the allocation of seats in 
the European Parliament or the rules on the financing 
of the EU are – in terms of complexity – almost akin 
to an amendment to the EU treaties. As Section 4 
3 See e.g. Andrew Duff, “Everything you need to know about Article 50 (but were afraid to ask)”, Verfassungsblog, 4 July 2016.
4  See e.g. Jean-Claude Piris, “Which options would be available to the United Kingdom in case of a Withdrawal from the EU?”, CSF-SSSUP Working 
Paper No 1/2015 and Henrik Enderlein, “What Should Happen? What is Likely to Happen? Notes on Brexit”, Jacques Delors Institut – Berlin Policy 
Paper, 30 June 2016. 
5   See also Patrick Birkinshaw and Andrea Biondi (eds), Britain Alone (Wolters Kluwer 2016) and Brexit, Special Supplement (2016) 17 German Law 
Journal 1.
6  See Christopher Hooton and Jon Stone, “Brexit: Article 50 was never actually meant to be used, says its author”, The Independent, 26 July 2016.
7  See Case 294/83 Les Verts [1986] ECR 1339 (ECJ defining the EU treaties as the EU “constitutional charter”).
8   See President of the European Commission, in collaboration with the Presidents of the European Council, the Eurogroup, the European Central 
Bank and the European Parliament, report “Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union”, 22 June 2015.
9   See President of the European Central Bank, introductory statement before the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parlia-
ment, 15 June 2015. 
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conclusively suggests, therefore, Brexit offers the 
window of opportunity to pursue other needed re-
forms of EU primary law.
Amendments to the EU treaties
The most glaring treaty amendment which will have 
to be made as a result of the withdrawal of the UK 
from the EU regards Article 52 TEU. This provision 
lists the EU member states, and currently reads as 
follows:
1. The Treaties shall apply to the Kingdom of Belgium, the 
Republic of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of 
Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of 
Estonia, Ireland, the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, 
the French Republic, the Republic of Croatia, the Italian 
Republic, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the 
Republic of Lithuania, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the 
Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Kingdom of 
the Netherlands, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of 
Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Republic of 
Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, the Republic of Finland, the 
Kingdom of Sweden and the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland.
2. The territorial scope of the Treaties is specified in Article 
355 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
[TFEU].
Article 52 TEU lists the member states of the EU, and 
has been updated over time to account for the en-
largement of the EU. The last amendment to this 
provision was introduced in 2013, when Croatia joined 
the EU as its 28th member state. On that occasion, 
Article 13 of the Act concerning the conditions of 
accession of the Republic of Croatia, which is annexed 
to the Treaty between the 27 EU member states and 
Croatia, modified Article 52 TEU so as to include 
Croatia in the list of EU member states.10 The Treaty 
of accession of Croatia, like any other previous acces-
sion treaty, had to be ratified by the applicant country 
as well as by all the other EU member states, in 
accordance with their respective constitutional 
requirements. 
After the UK withdraws from the EU, Article 52 TEU 
will have to be modified, and the only way to do so is 
through a treaty revision procedure. In fact, an im-
portant point needs to be underlined. Article 49 TEU 
(which regulates enlargement) explicitly authorizes 
“adjustments to the Treaties on which the Union is 
founded” to be made in the accession agreement 
between the member states and the applicant coun-
try. In other words, formal modifications of the EU 
treaties which result from the accession of a new 
member state can be dealt with in the accession 
treaty and accompanying documents – without the 
need for a revision of the EU treaties according to the 
rules of Article 48 TEU. On the contrary, Article 50 
TEU (which regulates withdrawal) does not mention a 
specular rule, and merely states that the EU shall 
“conclude an agreement with [the withdrawing] State, 
setting out the arrangement for its withdrawal, taking 
into account of the framework for its future relation-
ship with the Union”. Since the withdrawal pact is 
negotiated by the EU like any other normal interna-
tional agreement pursuant to the rules of Article 
218(3) TFEU – and is thus a legal act which in hierar-
chical terms is inferior to the EU treaties11 – this 
implies that in order to modify Article 52 TEU and 
remove the name of the UK from the list of EU mem-
ber states resort should be made to the normal 
amendment procedure of Article 48 TEU. An interna-
tional agreement concluded by the EU, in fact, cannot 
modify EU primary law.12 In other words, whereas in 
the case of enlargement the accession agreement 
suffices to introduce formal amendments to the EU 
treaties (such as a change to Article 52 TEU), in the 
case of withdrawal the secession agreement cannot 
do: Here formal adjustments to the EU treaties have 
to be undertaken through the general revision proce-
dure disciplined in Article 48 TEU.
As is well-known, Article 48 TEU outlines two mecha-
nisms that can be used to amend the EU treaties: a 
simplified revision procedure, and an ordinary revi-
sion procedure. However, according to Article 48(6) 
TEU the simplified revision procedure can be used 
only in order to “revise all or part of the provisions of 
Part Three of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU” 
and at the condition that the amendment “shall not 
increase the competences conferred on the Union in 
the Treaties”. In order to modify Article 52 TEU, 
therefore, resort has to be made to the ordinary 
10   See Art 13 Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Republic of Croatia and the adjustments to the Treaty on European Union and the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ 2012 L 112/25.
11  See Art 218(11) TFEU.
12  See Paul Craig, The Treaty of Lisbon: Law, Politics and Treaty Reform (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2010) 401. 
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revision procedure. This procedure requires the 
European Council to “convene a Convention com-
posed of representatives of the national Parliaments, 
of the Heads of State or Government of the Member 
States, of the European Parliament and of the 
Commission” and charged to “adopt by consensus a 
recommendation [to amend the treaties] to a confer-
ence of representatives of the governments of the 
Member States.” Pursuant to Article 48(3) TEU the 
European Council may decide by a simple majority 
“not to convene a Convention should this not be 
justified by the extent of the proposed amendments” 
– but it must obtain the consent of the European 
Parliament to do so: hence the European Parliament 
can insist on calling a Convention to examine propos-
als for revisions to the EU treaties.13 Finally, a confer-
ence of representatives of the member states has to 
determine “by common accord” the amendments to 
the treaties which “shall enter into force after being 
ratified by all the Member States in accordance with 
their respective constitutional requirements.” 
In sum, when the UK withdraws from the EU, the 
other member states will have to amend the EU 
treaties – at the minimum to modify Article 52 TEU. 
As explained above, the withdrawal agreement cannot 
be used to amend Article 52 TEU, since an interna-
tional treaty concluded by the EU under Article 218 
TFEU cannot bring about a modification to EU primary 
law. Moreover, the simplified treaty amendment 
procedure cannot be used to change Article 52 TEU, 
which means that the ordinary treaty amendment 
procedure is required in this context. It is quite possi-
ble that the remaining 27 member states in the 
European Council will quickly settle to modify Article 
52 TEU and decide that a Convention is not needed for 
such a formal amendment. However, as mentioned, 
Article 48 TEU gives to the European Parliament the 
right to veto the European Council’s position and to 
insist on convening a Convention. Considering that 
the European Parliament has called for the establish-
ment of a Convention to fix the EU treaties on multi-
ple occasions,14 it cannot be excluded that it will 
exploit the opportunity created by Brexit to force the 
European Council to eventually set in motion a broad-
er project of revisions and updates to the EU constitu-
tional documents. 
Amendments to other EU legal acts  
of a quasi con stitutional nature
Besides the amendment to the EU treaties discussed 
above – which is macroscopic, but admittedly formal 
– the (remaining) member states of the EU will also 
have to revise other EU legal acts which are instead of 
high substantive and political salience. Following the 
UK withdrawal from the EU, in particular, the two 
most important EU legal measures which will need to 
be revised by the EU institutions and its member 
states are the decision on the allocation of seats in 
the European Parliament, and the rules on the fi-
nancing of the EU. Both these legal acts are formally 
not treaty amendments, since there is no need to use 
the procedure of Article 48 TEU to change them. And 
yet, in substance, these acts have a quasi-constitu-
tional status, since they deal with crucial aspects of 
the functioning of the EU such as the organization of 
the European Parliament, and the funding of the EU. 
In fact, the approval of these acts is subject to special 
legislative procedures which are akin – for all practi-
cal purposes – to a treaty revision: Modifying the 
decision on the composition of the European 
Parliament and the decision on the own resources of 
the EU requires member states’ unanimity, and 
European Parliament involvement, as well as ratifica-
tion by each member state according to its respective 
constitutional requirements. The necessity to re-
adopt these crucial EU legal acts to adapt the EU to 
the departure of the UK will thus compel the member 
states to engage in the broad and complex bargaining 
process proper of major constitutional reforms.
The decision establishing the composition  
of the European Parliament
When the UK withdraws from the EU, the composition 
of the European Parliament will have to be modified 
to account for the secession of one of its (most popu-
lous) member states. Whereas the EU treaties provi-
sions dealing with the European Council, the Council 
and the European Commission can be applied with-
out much ado to a Union at 27, institutional engi-
neering is needed to adapt the European Parliament 
to the new reality. According to Article 14(2) TEU, in 
fact, the European Parliament shall be composed of 
13  See Jean-Claude Piris, The Lisbon Treaty: A Legal and Political Analysis (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2010) 104. 
14  See e.g. European Parliament Resolution of 2 February 2012 on the European Council meeting of 30 January 2012, P7_TA(2012)0023 para 9; Europe-
an Parliament Resolution of 20 November 2012 towards a Genuine EMU, P7_TA(2012)0430 para 6; European Parliament Resolution of 12 December 
2013 on the constitutional problems of multi-tier governance in the European Union, P7_TA(2013)0598 paras 67-69. 
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750 members, plus the President – hence, for a total 
of 751 MEPs, to be elected in the various member 
states according to the principle of degressive pro-
portionality “with a minimum threshold of six mem-
bers per Member State. No Member State shall be 
allocated more than ninety-six seats.” 
As clarified in Article 14(2) TEU too, the specific 
allocation of European Parliament’s seats in the 
various member states is determined in a European 
Council decision, “adopted by unanimity, on the 
initiative of the European Parliament and with its 
consent.” Currently, the composition of the 
European Parliament is set in a European Council 
decision adopted in June 2013.15 This decision – the 
first passed since the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty – determined the apportionment of seats in 
the 8th European Parliament elections in June 2014 
and was the result of a long wrangling among the 
member states.16 In fact, the difficulties to find an 
acceptable compromise between member states and 
among EU institutions on the allocation of European 
Parliament seats emerged prominently in the negoti-
ations leading to the Lisbon Treaty and are reflected 
in the fact that Declarations No. 4 and No. 5, annexed 
to the EU treaties, concern specifically this issue. 
Declaration No. 4, in particular, indicates that “the 
additional seats in the European Parliament” (i.e. the 
751st seat) will be attributed to Italy, and Declaration 
No. 5 states that the European Council “will give its 
political agreement on the revised draft Decision on 
the composition of the European Parliament for the 
legislative period 2009-2014, based on the proposal 
from the European Parliament.” These declarations 
– which technically are not binding, and do not have 
the same legal values as the EU treaties – testify 
however to concerns that member states and EU 
institutions have on such a delicate issue. 
Following the departure of the UK, the member states 
in the European Council and the European Parliament 
will have to agree on a new decision on the allocation 
of seats in the European Parliament. In fact, the June 
2013 European Council decisions already anticipated 
that a new formula for the allocation of seats had to 
be agreed upon in view of the 9th European 
Parliament elections in 2019,17 and the European 
Parliament is expected to come up with a proposal 
shortly. Yet, it is clear that the withdrawal of the UK 
creates space for major new demands by several 
countries, and potentially for a heavy reshuffling of 
seats. In fact, the currently binding European Council 
decision assigns to the UK 73 seats in the European 
Parliament – the third largest delegation (after 
Germany and France, and on a par with Italy).18 The 
new apportionment decision will have to be proposed 
by the Parliament, approved unanimously by the 
European Council, sanctioned by the European 
Parliament; and then de facto it will have to be 
ratified domestically by each of the member states, 
since national legislation will need to be put in place 
to regulate the specific modalities for electing the 
number of MEPs assigned to each member state by 
the EU decision. It is clear therefore that much will be 
at stake during the negotiations. After all, compara-
tive studies reveal that choices on the allocation of 
seats in compound or federal systems are often taken 
within the framework of broader constitutional 
bargains, when units which may be losing in terms of 
corporate representation can be compensated with 
other payoffs.19
In sum, the need to adopt a new decision on the 
composition of the European Parliament after Brexit 
seems to create once more a window of opportunity 
for significant updates and revisions to the EU insti-
tutional set-up. Amending the decision on the allo-
cation of seats within the European Parliament is 
– in terms of complexity – almost tantamount to a 
treaty revision. It cannot be excluded therefore that 
some institutions, or some member states, may 
exploit this opportunity to call for a more ful-
ly-fledged change to the EU institutional architecture, 
or at least to some other specific amendments to EU 
primary law. As a result, the adoption of a new deci-
sion on apportionment of seats in the European 
Parliament may trigger pressures for a broader pack-
age-deal with more far-reaching constitutional 
consequence.
15  European Council Decision of 28 June 2013 establishing the composition of the European Parliament, 2013/312/EU, OJ 2013 L 181/57.
16   See further Federico Fabbrini, “Representation in the European Parliament: of False Problems and Real Challenges” (2015) 75 Zeitschrift für aus-
ländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 823.
17  See Art 5, European Council Decision 2013/312/EU.
18  See Art 3, European Council Decision 2013/312/EU. 




In addition to the new rules on the allocation of seats 
for the European Parliament, another legal area where 
major changes will be necessitated in the EU by Brexit 
concerns the rules on the financing of the EU: after the 
UK withdraws from the EU, the system of revenues and 
expenditures of the EU will need to be largely reformed. 
The provisions of the EU treaties regulating the financ-
ing of the EU set up a highly technical and complex 
system. In a nutshell, however, the system can be 
described as follows. First, under Article 312 TFEU, the 
Council, acting unanimously and with the consent of 
the European Parliament shall adopt a regulation 
laying down the multiannual financial framework 
(MFF) of the EU: this regulation, usually adopted for a 
7-year time-span, “shall ensure that Union expendi-
ture develops in an orderly manner”. Second, under 
Article 311 TFEU, the Council, acting unanimously and 
after consulting the European Parliament shall adopt a 
decision laying down the system of own resources of 
the Union: this decision – which “shall not enter into 
force until it is approved by the Member States in 
accordance with their respective constitutional re-
quirements” – defines the revenue side of the EU 
financing, and thus complements the MFF regulation 
which instead sets the expenditure side. Third, based 
on the funding prospect set in the own resources 
decision and in light of the expenditure plan sketched 
in the MFF regulation, the European Parliament and 
the Council adopt every year the annual budget of the 
EU, according to the detailed procedural rules en-
shrined in Article 314 TFEU.
The current rules on the financing of the EU were set  
in a package of legal measures adopted after the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty. In particular, on the 
revenue side, the own resources of the EU are set in a 
Council decision adopted in May 2014.20 On the ex-
penditure side, instead, rules are condensed in a 
Council regulation adopted in December 2013, which 
sets the MFF for 2014-2020.21 Both these legal mea- 
sures were the result of highly complex political 
negotiations. A proposal for a new own resources 
decision was tabled by the Commission in 2011,22 and it 
took 3 years to approve it in the Council: in fact, the 
own resources decision is still subject to parliamentary 
ratification in several member states (but will apply 
retroactively as from 1 January 2014, when national 
ratification will be completed).23 At the same time, 
negotiations for the MFF 2014-2020 broke down on 
several occasions, and the intervention of the Euro pean 
Council (in place of the Council) was necessary in order 
to find a compromise among the member states.24 
As is well-known, the difficulties in negotiating the 
own resources decision and the MFF regulation are a 
result of the way in which the EU is currently funded.25 
Despite the letter and the spirit of the EU treaties, EU 
resources are today mostly transferred to Brussels 
from member states’ coffers: EU countries therefore 
consider the contributions they make to the EU budget 
as their money, and aggressively measure the differ-
ence between their contributions to, and their re-
ceipts from, the EU budget. As a result of this state of 
affairs, the decision-making process about the EU 
budget has been captured by endless negotiation 
among the member states about the precise costs and 
benefits that each country would incur. Because no 
member state its willing to transfer its money to the 
EU budget for the benefit of other member states, the 
discussion about the EU funding have become in-
creasingly costly and decreasingly effective – every 
member state having a veto power on how much 
resources the EU should raise and how it should spend.
Given this situation, it is to be expected that after the 
withdrawal of the UK the negotiations of the new EU 
financial framework will be highly contentious. 
Although the UK enjoys a famous rebate (obtained in 
1984, and preserved ever since) which allows it to pay 
less than it should, it still remains one of the major 
contributors to the EU budget – the 4th total net 
payer into the EU coffers (after Germany, France and 
Italy), according to the latest figures of the European 
Commission (for 2014).26 Hence, when the UK will 
20 Council Decision of 26 May 2014 on the system of own resources of the European Union, 2014/335/EU, Euratom, OJ 2014 L 168/105.
21  Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1311/2013 of 2 December 2013 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2014-2020,  
OJ 2013 L 347/884.
22 See Commission proposal for a Council Decision on the system of own resources of the European Union, 29 June 2011, COM(2011)510 final.
23 See Art 11 Council Decision 2014/335/EU, Euratom. 
24 See European Council meeting, 22-23 November 2012 (failing to reach agreement on MFF).
25 See further Federico Fabbrini, “Taxing and Spending in the Eurozone” (2014) 39 European Law Review 155. 




pull out of the EU – and unless the UK joins the EEA, a 
solution which would compel it to contribute to the 
EU budget as a condition to keeping access to the 
internal market27 – the question will arise of how to 
handle the loss of UK contributions to the EU budget. 
In principle, the EU could reduce expenditures in 
proportion to the UK quota – but it seems unlikely 
that member states which are net beneficiaries of EU 
spending would endorse such an outcome. Alterna-
tively, the member states (a.k.a. essentially the 
countries which are net contributors to the EU 
budget) could increase their contributions to wind-up 
the shortfall resulting from Brexit – but again it 
seems unlikely that countries which are already 
paying into the EU budget more than what they get in 
return would endorse this option. In this context, 
therefore, it cannot be excluded that Brexit will create 
a window of opportunity for a more significant con-
stitutional rethinking of the EU financing system.28
From this point of view, Brexit would feed into an 
ongoing discussion, tipping the balance in favor of 
some kind of legal reform. While the European 
Parliament has been pressing for the creation of a EU 
fiscal capacity through real EU taxes29 – a development 
which would be legally possible under Article 311 TFEU 
– a High Level Group on Own Resources chaired by 
former Commissioner and Italian Prime Minister 
Mario Monti is currently drafting a report with pro-
posals to reform the EU system of own resources.30 
Although until now member states’ governments have 
been lukewarm at these initiatives, in the aftermath 
of Brexit the idea of endowing the EU with adequate 
taxing and spending powers – independent from 
member states’ financial transfers – may acquire a 
new attractiveness as a way to provide adequate 
funding to the EU.
In sum, the need to adopt new legal rules for EU 
revenues and expenditures for the post-2020 financial 
framework attains a new meaning as a consequence of 
the British decision to secede from the EU. Given the 
complexities already characterizing the negotiations 
of the EU financing system, it is to be expected that 
the withdrawal of one of the (richest) member states 
will heat up further the tone of the future negotia-
tions, between member states, and among EU institu-
tions. Since the adoption of the MFF regulation, and 
even more so of the own resources decision, are 
practically tantamount to a treaty revision – as re-
flected in the need of state ratifications according to 
national constitutional requirements – major chal-
lenges are to be expected. Ironically, however, as the 
UK has traditionally been the strongest opponent to 
any initiative in favor of expanding the EU taxing 
powers, or of re-designing the EU spending system, its 
withdrawal from the EU may increase the chances that 
the (remaining) member states will agree on a reform 
of the EU financing system.
Conclusion
This paper explained that Brexit produces constitu-
tional implications not only for the UK but also for 
the EU. While in the immediate aftermath of the June 
2016 British referendum scholars’ and policy-makers’ 
attention has focused on the UK-side of the story, this 
paper has sought to highlight how the UK withdrawal 
from the EU will force the EU and its (remaining) 27 
member states to engage in significant legal and 
institutional reforms. Whether they like it or not, the 
EU and its member states will need to amend the EU 
treaties, and to revise other EU quasi-constitutional 
acts, in order to adapt the EU to a new reality of a 
Union at 27. 
In particular, as this paper has pointed out, changes 
have to be made – at a minimum – to Article 52 TEU, 
as well as to the decision on the composition of the 
European Parliament and the rules on the financing 
of the EU. While the amendment to Article 52 TEU is 
purely formal, it can only be accomplished through 
the treaty revision procedure enshrined in Article 48 
TEU. At the same time, while the amendments to the 
decision on the composition of the European 
Parliament and to the decision on the own resources 
(together with the MFF) do not formally amount to 
treaty change, they require special legislative proce-
dures which make them akin to a treaty revision 
process.
27 See Art 2 Protocol 38B on the EEA Financial Mechanism (2009-2014) to the EEA Agreement, OJ 2010 L 291/4. 
28  See Edoardo Traversa and Alexander Maitrot de la Motte, “Le fédéralisme économique et la fiscalité dans l’Union européenne”, in Stéphane De la 
Rosa et al. (eds), L’Union européene et le fédéralisme économique (Brussels, Bruylant 2015) 343.
29  See e.g. European Parliament Resolution of 20 November 2012 towards a genuine EMU, P7_TA(2012)0430, para 11; European Parliament Resolution 
of 23 May 2013 on future legislative proposals on EMU, P7_TA(2013)0222, para 22; European Parliament Resolution of 24 June 2015 on the review of 
economic governance framework: stocktaking and challenges, P8_TA(2015)0238, para 57(c).
30  See High Level Group on own resources, First Assessment Report, 17 December 2014.
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In this context, this paper suggested that Brexit 
opens new windows of opportunity for wider consti-
tutional changes in the EU. Resort to Article 48 TEU 
(to change Article 52 TEU) could be exploited by the 
European Parliament to push further with other 
revisions to EU primary law, as it has repeatedly 
advocated, especially in the field of EMU. Moreover, 
since the UK is one of the most populous and richest 
member states of the EU, its withdrawal from the EU 
will significantly change the stakes of the renegotia-
tion of the decision on the composition of the 
European Parliament and the rules on EU financing: 
while these acts were already scheduled to be re-
newed before 2019 (for the new European Parliament 
elections) and 2020 (for the new MFF), it seems clear 
that without the UK the other member states and the 
EU institutions will need to engage in a much more 
significant grand bargain, both to re-apportion seats 
and to re-think the revenues and expenditures of the 
EU for a post-Brexit era.
Moreover, if one takes into account that the member 
states which have signed the Treaty on the stability, 
coordination and governance of EMU (mostly known 
as the Fiscal Compact) and the Treaty on the transfer 
and mutualization of contributions to the Single 
Resolution Fund have committed to bring back the 
content of these intergovernmental agreements 
within the framework of EU law by 2018, and 2026 
respectively,31 it appears that Brexit reinforces the call 
for changes to the EU constitutional architecture 
which have been articulated in the context of the 
Euro-crisis.32 Since the domestication within the EU 
legal order of these interstate compacts (as well as 
potentially of the Treaty establishing a European 
Stability Mechanism) requires several revisions to the 
EU treaties, Brexit offers an excellent opportunity to 
accomplish what the Five Presidents’ Report, and 
other high-level policy documents, have 
recommended.33 
In conclusion, the withdrawal of the UK from the EU 
will trigger a process of legal and institutional tinker-
ing in the EU, which – if led by political vision railing 
social support – could be exploited to improve the 
constitutional architecture of the EU. 
31   See Art 16 Treaty on the Stability Coordination and Governance of the EMU and Art 16 Agreement on the Transfer and Mutualization of Contribu-
tions to the Single Resolution Fund.
32   See further Federico Fabbrini, Economic Governance in Europe (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2016) 283.
33   See Henrik Enderlein, Enrico Letta, Jörg Asmussen, Laurence Boone, Aart De Geus, Pascal Lamy, Philippe Maystadt, Maria João Rodrigues, Gertrude 
Tumpel-Gugerell, António Vitorino, Repair and Prepare: Growth and the Euro after Brexit, Gütersloh, Berlin, Paris: Bertelsmann Stiftung, Jacques 
Delors Institut – Berlin, and Jacques Delors Institute in Paris, forthcoming 2016.
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